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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
TACKLING ABUSIVE SUBCONTRACTING
To secure workers’ rights in supply chains, the ETUC is calling for a general legal framework on subcontracting, 
with a view to strengthening liability and transparency, and to ensure equal treatment, decent work and 
effective enforcement throughout the chain.
An EU legal framework on subcontracting should comprise, in particular:
     MEASURES FOR ENHANCED LIABILITY
• mandatory joint and several full chain liability of contractors should strengthen compliance with legal 
obligations and labour standards, including applicable collective agreements; 
• such liability schemes should cover both domestic and cross-border subcontracting situations, including 
in the context of public procurement;
     PRACTICES FOR ENSURING DECENT WORK
• workers’ rights to information, consultation and participation at board-level should be guaranteed as a 
means for strengthening workers’ influence on corporate behaviour;
• alert systems, control and audit measures and compliance monitoring procedures, such as e.g. codes of 
conduct or international framework agreements need to be established in collaboration with workers’ 
representatives and trade unions;
• subcontracting arrangements to circumvent collective agreements or opt for less favourable ones in the 
same sector of activity must be tackled. Collective bargaining and applicable collective agreements must 
be enforced throughout the subcontracting chain.
• the principle of equal treatment and its practical implementation in terms of equal pay for equal work 
in the same place should be ensured, independently of where the workers come from or how they are 
contracted;
     STANDARDS FOR INCREASED TRANSPARENCY
• a limitation of the number of subcontracting levels and a prohibition of further subcontracting as soon 
as labour-only subcontracting enters into a chain should be introduced; 
• mandatory non-financial reporting initiatives should be made more effective through the formulation of 
more precise and binding indicators, asking to ‘comply and explain’ instead of to ‘comply or explain’; 
• a binding duty of investigation and verification by the main contractor or leading undertaking of the 
genuine activity of the subcontractor, its social record and compliance with applicable regulation should 
be established;
     TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
• solvency guarantees that secure the payment of wages, social security payments and other social obliga-
tions must be (re)installed;
• accessible mechanisms for legal redress and recovery should be available for all workers and their repre-
sentatives to report abuses and enforce their rights;
• dissuasive and effective sanctions and compensations including back payments in case of non-respect 
of the applicable legislation and/or collective agreements.
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This report fits in an ETUC-project on ‘Securing Workers Rights in subcontracting chains’ as a second stage 
of research and analysis. The objective of the project is to build a case for a consistent EU approach towards 
subcontracting and to help create better tools and conditions (a more adequate legal framework) for workers’ 
representatives to know about their rights and to be informed and consulted about the practices of their 
company along its subcontracting chain. The first phase of the project was dedicated to several case studies. 
This second phase consists of an analysis of the existing legal framework, with different angles to be studied 
and information gathered on subcontracting aspects, such as due diligence, transparency and reporting require-
ments, joint & several liability, and different legal personalities treated as a single economic and social entity. 
A subcontract is defined as a commercial contract (for the provision) of services or a commercial contract 
(for the provision) of labour, works and materials between a main contractor and a providing or supplying 
contractor. The parties to the subcontract can be designated, on the one hand, by the term ‘main contractor’ 
or ‘user undertaking’ (sometimes also by the terms ‘principal’, ‘client undertaking’ or ‘purchaser’) and, on the 
other hand, by the term ‘supplier’ or ‘subcontractor’. Hereafter, we use the terms main contractor and subcon-
tractor. 
Important in this second phase is the mapping and clarification of the applicable legal framework. The main 
task was to analyse the existing legal frame (and its practical functioning) at international, EU and national 
level, identifying loopholes and contradictions. The analysis also covers legislative and non-legislative tools 
and practices in the framework of corporate social responsibility. The screening of the legal and regulatory 
framework had to identify existing provisions on subcontracting, and should lead to an overview of relevant 
international and national instruments dealing with subcontracting chains, including at UN, ILO and OECD 
levels. The scheme below summarises these aspects.
The next sections will deal with the four items identified in this scheme, followed by a section with some 
basic observations and a concluding section. Each section introduces the item briefly from a legal perspective, 
followed by a reflection on what is in it for workers’ reps in relation to labour rights and labour standards. Each 
section looks at the levels listed in the scheme (international, EU, national) but, given the research task, the 
main focus will be on binding legal provisions. Moreover, the national analysis is dedicated to some prominent 
examples.1
1 The research during the second stage was limited to a legal analysis. Our principal point of reference is the attention paid to workers’ rights in 
situations of subcontracting as enshrined in binding regular frameworks and legal provisions. 
INTRODUCTION
A. INTERNATIONAL  
STANDARDS
B. EU DIRECTIVES OR  
REGULATIONS
C. NATIONAL  
PROVISIONS
Regulation of subcontracting 
(if any)
Due diligence
Joint & several liability
Transparency and reporting
     Subcontracting - Starting point for an analysis of the regulatory frame
SUBCONTRACTING AND SOCIAL LIABILITY
SUBCONTRACTING AND SOCIAL LIABILITY
7
In the last decades, many labour-intensive industries went through a stage that can be characterised by a 
process of outsourcing and externalisation of activities (Weil 2014). Through subcontracting, the production 
process takes the form of a fragmented multiple chain of activities that is at the same time a value chain. The 
application of subcontracting in a chain of production or services can be motivated by different arguments: a 
search for specialism and knowhow not available in-company, the sourcing of specific tasks that do not belong 
to the core activity, efficiency seeking, a (traditionally grown) division of labour, with long-standing partner-
ships based on mutual trust, routine or historical arrangements. In genuine cases, a chain is based on, or 
results in stable relationships between a main contractor who ‘delegates’ part of the work to specialised and 
preferred subcontractors. Accordingly, activities, carried out simultaneously or in different parts of (sometimes 
long) subsequent production chains, are executed by various contractors or subcontractors. The chain forms 
a hierarchical socio-economic dependency network or triangle, based on intertwined series of (commercial) 
contracts. The chain constitutes a logistical chain (both horizontal and vertical), as well as a value-chain of an 
economic and productive nature. Single specialities or parts of a production process are outsourced to external 
legal entities, often small firms or even self-employed. 
However, subcontracting and outsourcing to de jure independent entities does not lead to de facto inde-
pendency. The main undertaking dictates and manages the process. The subcontractor undertakes to perform 
a specific activity in exchange for an agreed price. Companies at lower levels in the value chain, with the 
exception of specialised subcontractors with high tech or activities of high added value, are often not in a 
position to act on equal footing with the main undertaking and sometimes have to deal with abnormally low 
contracts for the delivery of their products or services. Since the 1980s, traditional subcontracting, through 
a stable and cooperative division of labour in the production process, altered to a type of outsourcing that 
was much more cost driven and companies replaced direct employees with all kinds of ‘new’ employment 
relations. Work has been handed over to external ‘third’ parties and executed by ‘employers’ pretending to 
belong to other branches, by specialised subcontractors, temporary work agencies, labour-only subcontrac-
tors and/or self-employed. As a result, the post-war model of undertakings with skilled and unskilled workers 
contributing their labour under the supervision and authority of one liable and responsible employer is no 
longer the standard model. The possibility to outsource parts of the production process and the intensification 
of subcontracting, driven by a strategy to reduce costs and to avoid direct employment of workers, created a 
playground for all kind of (commercial) contracts for ‘supplying’ parts of the production that do not fit in the 
classical model (Cremers 2009). 
The dependency in the chain can have serious drawbacks. On top of the triangle, there are the often long 
established and completely legal undertakings. Unequal bargaining power in the chain can lead to question-
able commercial contracts that define the market transactions between the different levels, with abnormally 
low-priced outsourcing and tendering. A cost driven chain can easily end up in the informal economy, espe-
cially when large settled companies transfer the recruitment of the labour force to labour-only subcontractors 
that multiply this transmission and drive it even further down by the use of temporary work agencies, gang-
masters and other intermediaries (Cremers 2009). The pursuit of the lowest nominal costs of production under-
Subcontracting – 
from a genuine division  
to the ‘fissured workplace’ 1
1.1  SUBCONTRACTING, OUTSOURCING AND EXTERNALISATION  
     OF THE WORKFORCE
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mines investment in technology and training, and improvements in productivity and quality. In this process, 
workers are seriously at risk of a partial or complete non-compliance with mandatory labour standards that 
are based on equal pay and other equal treatment principles, resulting in a denial of social rights and non-ac-
cess to HR-services, absence of training facilities, and social and cultural exclusion. Crucial social risks are 
transferred away from the main contractor to SMEs and/or individual workers. The lower segment is than an 
irregular supply of cheap labour, resulting in low pay, poor working conditions, inadequate occupational health 
and safety, a lack of corporate responsibility, substantial distortion of the labour market and sometimes even 
‘modern slavery’.
1.2  REGULATION OF SUBCONTRACTING
The starting point for the provision of services or products is a contract under which a person or an under-
taking known as the ‘main contractor’ undertakes to perform a specific project for another person known as 
the ‘client’ who pays him/her a price for it, without there being any employment relationship between them. 
A subcontractor is, in legal terms, a firm that concludes with such a main undertaking a contract for the 
delivery of (parts of) the service or the product. Such subcontracts for services, supplies or works, may also 
be concluded between the subcontractor and subsequent subcontractors (including self-employed), resulting 
in a longer value chain. The relationship between the main undertaking and the (subsequent) subcontracting 
entities is based on a commercial contract, not on an employment contract. A contract for the delivery of 
services or products does not necessarily makes the main undertaking or the subcontractor mutually liable 
for the different aspects of non-genuine activities, on the contrary. In fact, this can vary (towards customers, 
clients or workers) depending on the arrangement between the contracting partners. In most legislation in 
force, the subcontracting entity is the employer of its workers involved in carrying out the services and as such 
responsible for any breach of workers’ rights. A clear exception in this area is the application of OHS-regula-
tions in the EU. In case a worker employed by a subcontractor performs activities on a workplace of the main 
undertaking, responsibility for some aspects of the occupational health and safety are shared.2 It is interesting 
to consider whether there is any comparable remedy enshrined in the national or EU-legislation to tackle 
potential negative effects related to the non-respect of other labour standards and/or breaches of labour law. 
Although the European Commission has dealt with the issue over a long period of time, there is no direct 
legislation developed that deals with subcontracting as a market phenomenon with a social impact or with 
subcontractors as legal entities bound by specific rules or conditions in the social field. In an early European 
Commission notice, subcontracting is defined as a situation whereby one undertaking, called ‘the contractor’, 
whether or not in consequence of a prior order from a third party, entrusts to another, called ‘the subcon-
tractor’, the manufacture of goods, the supply of services or the performance of work under the contractor’s 
instructions (European Commission 1978). 
In 1998, the European Commission published a vast guide (Law of industrial subcontracting in the European 
Community: a practical guide) that provides an overview of relevant aspects of subcontracting in the Member 
States at that time. The title of the guide is somehow misleading as there is, next to the regulation of general 
conditions of commercial contracts and some bits and pieces concerning liability for defective products, no 
law on industrial subcontracting at the level of the European Union. The guide fits in the mainstream EU-policy 
of the promotion of competition and was and is published by DG Internal Market with the aim to facilitate the 
improvement of contractual relationships between main contractors and subcontractors, in particular when 
these relationships have transnational aspects.3 
2 The 1989 EU Framework Directive for safety and health at the workplace (89/391/EEC) prescribes that an ‘employer shall take appropriate meas-
ures so that employers of workers from any outside undertakings and/or establishments engaged in work in his undertaking and/or establishment 
receive, in accordance with national laws and/or practices, adequate information’ concerning health and safety risks and the measures taken (Article 
10). This was implemented in sector-specific Directives. The 1991 EU Directive on temporary agencies (91/383/EEC) adds that ‘without prejudice to 
the responsibility of the temporary employment business as laid down in national legislation, the user-undertaking and/or establishment is/are 
responsible, for the duration of the assignment, for the conditions governing performance of the work’ (Article 8). The EU Directive on the imple-
mentation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites (92/57/EEC) adds an important provision and 
introduces mandatory coordination between the various parties in a chain, including self-employed on site (from the project preparation stage to 
the completion of a work).  
3 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/law-industrial-subcontracting-european-community-practical-guide-rev-ed-0_en 
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The 1998 guide presents a glossary and a comparative approach of the legal systems governing subcontracting 
relationships in each of the Member States of the European Community back then. Its content covers the legal 
description of subcontracting, the determination of the applicable law and of the competent jurisdiction, the 
binding effect of preliminary negotiations and the rights and obligation of the signatories and other issues 
related to the contract. It defines subcontracting as a transaction by which one enterprise, called the ‘subcon-
tractor’, is commissioned by another enterprise, called the ‘main contractor’, to provide the latter with goods or 
services that the main contractor will use for own commercial purposes, often, but not always, by incorporating 
these goods or services into a whole. In this commercial transaction, there is no employment relationship 
between the signatures.4
Two chapters of the 1998 comparative guide provide possible relationships with labour issues that can be elab-
orated further. A first link comes out of the section that distinguish a contract for the delivery of services from 
an employment contract, a second relationship can be situated in the liability sections.  
a.  With some exceptions, industrial subcontracts are not subject to specific regulations of employment issues 
A majority of the Member States has no specific provisions on industrial subcontracting, with the result 
that the subject is classified in accordance with the regulations on commercial relations as laid down in the 
national Civil Codes. Most often, such legal provisions on subcontracting do not provide clear criteria for the 
demarcation between a subcontract and an employment contract (or in the British common law vocabulary: a 
contract ‘for services’ versus a contract ‘of services’). The 1998 guide mentions only a few countries, where the 
demarcation with employment contracts is explicitly introduced in the regulation of subcontracts. For instance, 
in Finland, the subcontract will be described as a contract of employment if a subcontractor works for an 
employer in circumstances characteristic of a contract of employment. In this case, the rules of the contract 
of employment will apply (wages, working conditions et cetera) even if the parties have agreed to waive them. 
In the meantime, the courts in most other EU countries take such a ‘substance over form’ or ‘primacy of the 
facts’ approach as well.5 This means that the courts can reclassify a contract, which according to the wordings 
(stipulating the parties’ intentions) was labelled as a subcontract, if the execution of that contract in practice 
shows that (‘taking all circumstances into account’) it is in reality rather a contract of employment. Whether or 
not the person who agrees to carry out work for another person against payment, works in reality in subordi-
nation or can genuinely independently decide how, when and where to work him/herself, is the key indicator 
in misclassification court suits.6 
Important from the perspective of this study is that the reclassification ‘risk’ is only substantial in (sub)contrac-
tual relations with (bogus) self-employed contractual counterparts. In particular, it may have deterrent impact 
on the stronger contractors in the chain if these entities have direct (sub)contracting relationships with many 
(bogus) independent contractors. In contrast, courts operate very cautiously in cases where it is claimed that 
the corporate personality of a (sub)contracting company is being used as a mask by the other contracting party 
to escape employer responsibilities. Usually, beyond-every-possible-doubt proof must be provided before a 
court would decide that another party in the chain than the formal employer is the ‘real’ employer. Hence, it 
is very difficult to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ and successfully challenge before the court so-called letterbox 
companies who act as the formal employer while in reality the employees work under supervision of the 
contractual counterpart (the user undertaking).
b. In general terms clauses excluding liability can be considered valid in so far as they are not contrary to 
public policy
The 1998 overview reveals that in relation to the exemption from liability or clauses excluding liability, there is 
reference to good morals and incompatibility with public policy, mandatory rules and fundamental principles 
of law. However, in most countries this is not further specified in the national regulations. The main items in 
this regard are liability for the design, the performance, the quality or (hidden) defects. Contractual liability 
involves in these situations the obligation on a contracting party who fails to fulfil all or part of the obliga-
4 Interestingly, the guide makes a distinction between different types of subcontracting agreements (related to products, services and equipment). 
Labour-only subcontracting is not mentioned in the guide.
5 However, in Poland, the description of the status as worker or self-employed is subject to the will of the parties.
6 In relation to gig work via app, there have recently been some landmark judgments from the Supreme Court of the UK (19 February 2021) and the 
Superior Court of California (August 10, 2020), reclassifying drivers as being employed by Uber and Lyft instead of collaborating with these platforms 
as an independent ‘partner’.
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tions under the contract to make good the damage caused to the other party either by the complete or partial 
non-performance or by the late performance of the contractual obligations. This includes the subcontractor’s 
liability for damages caused by its employees. Liability provisions related to workers’ rights or labour standards 
are rather rare. Interestingly, the Portuguese regulations specify explicitly that it is prohibited to exclude or 
restrict in contract clauses, directly or indirectly, liability for injury to the life, mind, body or health of persons. 
Moreover, it is not possible to exclude or restrict, directly or indirectly, liability for acts of agents and employees 
in cases of deception, misrepresentation, serious negligence or misconduct.
Since the publication of the 1998 guide, the national regulations of subcontracting have not changed to a 
significant degree. However, some substantial national initiatives (Spain, Finland, Germany) are explored below. 
But first, we will have a look at the case law at EU-level. In the frame of the public procurement regula-
tions, a limitation of subcontracting was subject to court deliberations. Overall and over the years, the CJEU 
has stressed that a prohibition or restriction on subcontracting may be allowed only in situations where the 
contracting authority has not been in a position to verify the technical and economic capacities of the subcon-
tractors. Thus, if the contracting authority can check the ‘technical and economic capacities’ of a subcontractor, 
subcontracting cannot be prohibited or restricted, at least not in the tendering stage. In recent years, the 
CJEU has reiterated that across-the-board quantitative restrictions of subcontracting is contrary to EU public 
procurement law.7 
The CJEU held, in 2016, but still based on the previous Directive 2004/18 in one case (Wrocław, C-406/14), that the 
primary position under the EU procurement regime was that there should be no limitation on subcontracting, 
except in specific circumstances where the restriction can be justified by a legitimate interest in ensuring the 
proper execution of the contract. Beforehand, the advocate general had already stated that restrictions on 
subcontracting defeated one of the purposes of the EU’s public procurement Directives, which are ‘designed 
not only to avoid obstacles to freedom to provide services in the aware of public service contracts or public 
works contracts but also to guarantee the opening up of public procurement to competition’. According to that 
opinion, possibilities of subcontracting are liable to encourage small and medium-sized undertakings to get 
involved in the (transnational) public contracts procurement market and should enable such undertakings 
to participate in tendering procedures and to be awarded public contracts regardless of the size of those 
contracts.8 
In a second case with cross-border impact (Borta UAB, C-298/15), the CJEU ruled in 2017 that restrictions in the 
Lithuanian legislation in which a successful tenderer itself was obliged to perform the ‘main works’ directly, 
were contrary to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 
must be interpreted as precluding such a provision of national law. A prescribed restriction is only justified 
in so far as it pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest, and to the extent that it complies with the 
proportionality principle.9
Finally, it has to be noted that in the Draft for the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive (hereafter PWD), 
a provision was included concerning posted workers in subcontracting chains, establishing equal pay between 
posted workers and workers employed by the main contractor including those standards in company level 
agreements on a voluntary basis (on a proportionate and non-discriminatory basis). This was deleted from 
the version finally adopted. It would have required that the same obligations would be imposed also on 
all national subcontractors. The proposed provision was directly related to the CJEU judgment in RegioPost 
C-115/14 on public procurement, after which it became clear that Member States may impose the obligation to 
respect statutory minimum applicable rates of pay to the tenderers and their subcontractors.
7 Nevertheless, although Directive 2014/24 does not define the term ‘subcontracting’, article 63(2) of Directive 2014/24 includes a provision that can 
be seen as allowing a limitation of subcontracting. In the case of ‘works contracts, service contracts and siting or installation operations in the con-
text of a supply contract, contracting authorities may require that certain critical tasks be performed directly by the tenderer itself or, where the ten-
der is submitted by a group of economic operators….by a participant in that group’. In this case, the contractor must perform those tasks directly. It is 
not allowed to subcontract them or to otherwise entrust the tasks to third parties. In the implementing national provisions of some Member States 
subcontracting is defined. For example, in Poland, a subcontract is defined as a written contract for pecuniary interest having as its subject matter 
the services, supplies or works that constitute part of the public contract concluded between an economic operator selected by the contracting au-
thority and another entity (subcontractor). Similarly, Italian provisions define subcontracting as a contract according to which a contractor entrusts 
third parties with the execution of a part of the services or works that are the object of the public contract. National definitions, where used, have 
common characteristics, in that they either specify or imply that subcontracting may concern only a part or parts of a contract. Sometimes, national 
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1.3  INTERESTING NATIONAL INITIATIVES
The most far-reaching national regulation on subcontracting was concluded in Spain in 2006, the very first 
result of a Popular Legislative Initiative (ILP) dealing with labour issues that was presented to the Spanish 
Parliament (Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente 2016). In October 2006, the Spanish government approved a law to 
control subcontracting in the construction sector, mainly motivated by evidence that the use of long subcon-
tracting chains was one of the main causes of high industrial accident rates. The law prescribes that companies 
must engage a mandatory proportion of direct and permanent employment contract workers (at least 10% of a 
company’s workforce in a period of 18 months after the introduction of the law, increasing to 20% in the next 18 
months, and finally ending at 30%). The law stipulates that companies, which plan to subcontract, must register 
with their business address, have to provide quality and solvency guarantees, and the relationship between 
the main contractor and the subcontractors has to be written and maintained in a subcontracting book at the 
worksite. 
Article 4 of the Spanish law establishes that companies, which want to be contracted or subcontracted for 
construction works, must be registered in the Registry of Accredited Companies (REA - Registro de Empresas 
Acreditadas como Contratistas o Subcontratistas del Sector de la Construcción). This requirement applies to 
domestic firms and to cross-border service providers that translocate workers to Spain. Another important 
provision is the introduction of a restriction to three levels of successive subcontracting for specialised activ-
ities and only one level of subcontracting for labour-intensive jobs. The subcontracting chain has to stop 
whenever reference is made to self-employed or an ‘intensive subcontractor’, a firm or agency that solely 
supplies workers (labour-only subcontracting). The third subcontractors (and self-employed workers) will not 
be entitled to subcontract work that has been contracted to them, neither to another subcontractor firm nor to 
other self-employed workers (Article 5). Further levels are only acceptable due to technical production compli-
cations, for specialised activities in cases of ‘force majeure’ or in case of prior approval by the architectural 
supervision team. If the main contractor fails to comply with these legal provisions, subsidiary liability and 
responsibility is applicable. Liability responsibility is extended to all labour and social security obligations 
(Article 6.2). For example, the contractor can be held liable in case of non-payment of the social security contri-
butions of the employees of the subcontracted firm.10 
The law was assessed at EU-level mainly in relation to the functioning of the internal market, as containing 
‘restrictions’ to the freedom to provide services. The justification, namely the protection of workers´ health and 
security on site, can be classified as a public health justification and that is probably the reason why the law 
has not been a subject of European infringement procedures. The requirements were clarified by the First Addi-
tional Provision of Royal Decree 1109/2007, of 24 August 2007, which states that cross-border providers must be 
registered in the Register under the labour authority in whose territory they are going to carry out their first 
Spanish provision of services. This registration is not necessary when the duration of the cross-border service 
does not exceed eight days.11 
The law is still in place. However, it is not easy to find hard evidence on the actual functioning. And even more 
important, the financial crisis, and the following collapse and restructuring of the construction industry, with 
a proliferation of very small firms out of reach of the traditional mechanisms for enforcing compliance, meant 
that the legislation had to function in a completely changed environment. The result was a seriously reduced 
scope of coverage. 
In general, the driving forces behind the law, the Spanish trades unions, have the impression that while in big 
investment projects (with large firms) the level of compliance with the law is reasonable, in the deregulated 
sector of micro-firms (and informal employment) the level of compliance is poor. An in-depth assessment of 
the compulsory registration with the Registro de Empresas Acreditadas (REA) was published in 2019 (Rome-
ro-Barriuso et al. 2019). The analysis reveals that the public bodies in Spain, when acting as contractors in the 
construction sector, are to a great extent non-compliant with the obligation to register. The registration rates 
of 13.4% among Public Administrations, Municipal Town and City Councils and Provincial Councils, is in sharp 
10 To a certain extent this law is a follow-up of the implementation of the 1992 EU-Directive on temporary and mobile worksites that prescribes 
coordination and cooperation measures on construction sites. The law (Ley 32/2006 of 18 October 2006) was modified in 2009. The consolidated text 
can be found on: https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2006/BOE-A-2006-18205-consolidado.pdf 
11 https://app.mapfre.com/fundacion/html/revistas/seguridad/n110/articulo2En.html 
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contrast with the data from the private sector firms where registration stood at over 90%. According to the 
authors, this permissive attitude of non-compliance with the duty to register with the REA by the Public Admin-
istrations engaged in construction activities, as required by law, is a bad example for society. The behaviour of 
the Public Administrations should be exemplary and a model to follow for others. Interestingly, most private 
firms opine that the REA functions as a good instrument to control subcontracting in the construction sector 
and that it has increased the solvency and quality of construction sector firms. 
A second interesting legal innovation was adopted in Finland, in addition to its Procurement Act.12 The country 
adopted the general Act on the Contractor’s Obligations and Liability when Work is Contracted Out (1233/2006, 
hereafter Act on Contractor’s Liability) in November 2006 and supplemented the Act in 2012 with enhanced obli-
gations for the construction sector. The Act was amended several times. It applies to all sectors where subcon-
tracting or temporary agency work is utilised. At the time of the introduction, subcontracting was expanding 
in construction as well as spreading into other sectors. According to the legislator, long subcontracting chains 
could lead to situations where work was being carried out without withholding employee taxes, making VAT 
payments, making pension payments or observing conditions laid out in collective bargaining agreements. 
Therefore, legislation was deemed necessary that places the responsibility on users of subcontractors (both 
clients and main contractors) to guarantee compliance with legal and other obligations. The basic premise is 
that a contractor, before entering into an agreement, should ensure that its contracting partners comply with 
their statutory obligations.13 
According to the Finnish Act on Contractor’s Obligations, a contractor has an obligation to check the background 
of the contractual parties with whom an agreement involving temporary agency work or specific work based 
on subcontracting is concluded. Any company acting as contractor in a contractual chain is responsible to 
require the information mentioned in the Act. The Act on Contractor’s Liability is applicable for both domestic 
and foreign subcontractors and companies using temporary agency workers. Companies that make use of 
subcontracting or employment agency workers on a large scale, particularly in the construction sector, have to 
ask for and obtain documents that verify certain registrations and payment of taxes as well as a reference to 
applicable collective bargaining agreements or similar conditions. Companies have to give extracts of the Trade 
Register and accounts of whether the firm is entered in the Prepayment Register. Foreign subcontractors must 
submit information corresponding to the clarifications and certificates of the Act in the form of register extracts 
as stipulated by the laws of the country of business or similar certificates, or in another generally acceptable 
manner.
Assessments pinpoint uncertainty of the Act’s applicability, easy ways to circumvent the obligations and a 
lack of dissuasive penalties. The impression is that getting the required information on foreign companies is 
cumbersome. Contractors mainly criticise the ‘administrative burden’. Over the years, several court proceedings 
had to deal with provisions of the Finnish Act on Contractor’s Obligations, for instance when the legal form of 
a foreign firm corresponds with a limited company, the application in certain sectors, the application of limit 
values and thresholds, indicators whether information provided by a contracting partner is genuine, the negli-
gence of posting obligations, and the need to assess substance not only on entries in a register, but also on the 
basis of actual engagement in operations.14 
On a final note, worth mentioning is a recent legislative initiative in Germany, complementing the 2017 Act 
for Protection of Workers’ rights in the Meat Industry (Gesetz zur Sicherung von Arbeitnehmerrechten in der 
Fleischwirtschaft: GSA) which extends joint and several liability of the contractor and the subcontractor for 
social security contributions to companies in the meat industry (see for more details about the German system 
of chain liability below under section 3). A recent WSI-report observes that the result of this specific legisla-
tion so far has been limited (Erol 2021). Since 2017, the use of (bogus) posted workers dropped, but there is no 
substantial drop in the number of subcontracted workers (rather a replacement of posted workers by migrant 
workers employed by German temporary work agencies or subcontractors) or any marked improvement in their 
conditions.15 
12 For the latest consolidated English text, see: https://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20061233.pdf and for an explanation in English: https://
tyosuojelu.julkaisuverkossa.fi/tilaajavastuulaki_EN/#/article/1/page/1 
13 The social partners in construction published a Guide for employment of foreigners in Finland (in English) that explains the Act: https://www.
rakennusteollisuus.fi/globalassets/tyoelama/tyovoima/guide-for-employment-of-foreigners-2013.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-82,554 
14 See: https://www.tyosuojelu.fi/web/en/grey-economy/contractor-s-obligations-and-liability 
15 For a legal analysis of letterbox-practices with posted workers in the German meat sector, see Houwerzijl 2017.
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Repeated outbreaks of COVID-19 renewed public concern about the longstanding labour abuse in the German 
meat processing branch. This led to the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Act (Arbe-
itsschutzkontrollgesetz) of December 2020, providing for enhanced inspection on health and safety, together 
with a ban on contract work and stringent restrictions on the use of temporary agency workers in the meat 
industry. For companies in slaughter, cutting and deboning, with more than 50 employees, a ban on contracts 
for services (from 1 January 2021) and a ban on temporary agency work (from 1 April 2021) is introduced. For a 
transitional period of three years, temporary agency work can be used in other parts of the meat processing 
sector on the preconditions that a collective agreement applies and that agency employees account for at 
maximum 8 percent of a workplace’s employment, as measured in terms of annual working hours. Moreover, 
the maximum assignment length for temp agency workers will be 4 months and the same pay and condi-
tions for agency workers and core staff apply from the first day of the assignment. The hope is that allowing 
temporary agency work only if a collective agreement is concluded, will lead to renewed interest in collective 
bargaining on the employer’s side. This might contribute to ending the destructive price competition and the 
cost driven externalisation of the recruitment.
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2.1  BACKGROUND
Due diligence became common practice (and a common term) in the USA after the adoption of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. It requires a reasonable investigation, audit or review. After the adoption of the Act, securi-
ties dealers and brokers became responsible for fully disclosing material information about the instruments 
they were selling. Failing disclosure of information to potential investors made dealers and brokers liable for 
prosecution. As long as brokers and dealers exercised ‘due diligence’ or handled with reasonable care, when 
investigating the companies whose equities they were selling, and fully disclosed the results, they could not 
be held liable for information that was not discovered during the investigation. Investment analysis focused 
on value, in the sense of financial performance. In that context, due diligence stood for the verification and 
investigation of business transactions, such as the evaluation of assets in case of take-overs, and implicated 
the disclosure of the found information. Among institutional investors and business advisors, the 2005 Fresh-
fields Report is often seen as a turning point as it challenged the then mainstream market orthodoxy that 
environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) criteria and considerations by pension funds and other 
financial institutions and intermediaries in investment decisions were unlawful or a breach of fiduciary duties. 
The report explores the association between ESG considerations and investment decision making. It speaks 
about ‘extra-financial interests of savers in conjunction with their financial interests’ later on defined as certain 
social and environmental interests that find expression in international treaties, norms, and declarations, 
particularly those emerging from the democratic deliberative processes of the United Nations (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005).16 
Over the years, the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) has been working 
with the financial services sector and its stakeholders to understand better the two-way interaction between 
investment and the environmental and social context in which it takes place. The integration of ESG-criteria, 
including the social and environmental behaviour of companies, was more and more accepted as a valid 
and relevant consideration for investment. In the slipstream, the use of the term due diligence expanded to 
a broader practice; it became the investigation or exercise of care that a reasonable business or person is 
normally expected to take before entering into an agreement or commercial contract with another party. The 
concept of due diligence introduced by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
and the ILO Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy, later on 
incorporated in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, is the main reference in the current inter-
national context. According to these documents due diligence has to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account 
for’ adverse corporate impacts on human rights and the environment, with an extension to other areas of 
responsible business conduct. 
On 25 May 2011, the OECD member countries added another aspect of due diligence as they agreed to revise 
their guidelines promoting tougher standards of corporate behaviour, including human rights. The 2011 revision 
16 The Trump administration formulated in the summer of 2020 a regulation with the aim to restrict the use of ESG considerations in investment de-
cision-making. The text reaffirmed a return to the standard interpretation of fiduciary guidelines that only financial risks and returns should be con-
sidered in the management of U.S. employer-provided pension funds. ‘Non-pecuniary goals’, for example relating to political or public policy, should 
not guide pension investments. The Biden administration has planned to reverse the rule. The US Department of Labor announced on 10 March 2021 




led to an extension of the OECD Guidelines, particularly to other areas, such as the environment and climate 
change, as well as risks related to conflict, corruption, labour rights, disclosure and consumer interests. The 
new definition required a corporation to investigate third party partners for potential abuse of human rights. 
According to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises all members will ‘seek ways to prevent or 
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their business operations, products or 
services by a business relationship, even if they do not contribute to those impacts’.17
In a recent OECD publication, an analysis is provided of the application of Responsible Business Conduct objec-
tives (hereafter RBC objectives). The report highlights how OECD members and adherents to OECD instruments 
(the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) 
incorporate RBC objectives and risk-based due diligence into their public procurement systems. A key finding is 
that a majority of the analysed countries promote some environmental objectives through public procurement, 
but only a few have comprehensive frameworks addressing all RBC objectives throughout the entire supply 
chain. Over two-thirds of central purchasing bodies verify whether the main contractor complies with environ-
mental, labour rights and integrity-related requirements set in a contract, but do not verify compliance at the 
subcontractor level to the same extent. In practice, public procurement processes rarely include a consistent 
due diligence approach. The OECD recommends the adoption of a comprehensive approach to considering RBC 
objectives in public procurement systems, covering aspects of RBC objectives throughout the entire supply 
chain and throughout all phases of the public procurement cycle, with special attention given to contractual 
obligations (OECD 2020). 
In this respect, reference can be made also to Article 12.5 of the Enforcement Directive 2014/67, related to the 
posting of workers, that enables Member States on a voluntary basis to provide for a ‘due diligence escape 
clause’, according to which a contractor that has undertaken due diligence obligations as defined by national 
law shall not be liable. Specific requirements are not defined and are left, according to recital 37, to the discre-
tion of the Member States. They may include, inter alia, measures taken by the contractor concerning docu-
mentation of compliance with administrative requirements and control measures in order to ensure effective 
monitoring of compliance with the applicable rules on the posting of workers.
According to the 2019 European Commission report on application and implementation of Enforcement 
Directive 2014/67, sixteen Member States introduced the option of a due diligence defence. In eight cases, 
this took the form of an overall assessment of the contractor’s diligence in the individual case (Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK). Twelve Member States (Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Spain) formulated explicit criteria for the contractor’s obligations to control and/or promote compliance 
by a subcontractor stipulated by law, whereby the degree of detail ranges from a very general indication in 
Poland to an extensive enumeration of criteria in Croatia. The Italian law provides for due diligence only for the 
road transport sector (European Commission 2019). 
2.2  DEBATES ON THE REGULATORY FRAME
Due diligence can apply as a result of a voluntary action or of a mandatory obligation. Areas of concern 
continue to develop and cover issues such as finances and the commercial situation of company, international 
transactions, intellectual, real and personal property, insurance and liability coverage, labour matters, workers’ 
rights and employee benefits, legal and tax issues, environment and sustainability. 
Overlooking the literature produced in the last decades, the impression can easily be that there is a spectac-
ular increase of regulation. For instance, the Financial Times stated in May 2020 ‘Since 2018, there have been 
over 170 ESG (environmental, social and governance) related regulatory measures proposed globally - that 
is more than the previous six years combined.’ Datamaran, a software analytics platform that identifies and 
monitors external risks, including ESG, estimated in 2018 a 72% increase in ESG regulations and with over 4,000 
ESG mandatory and non-mandatory regulatory initiatives.18 According to other scholars, the pace of regula-
tory change on ESG - with the EU, UN, OECD and national governments becoming more active - has increased 




markedly since then (Parsons 2020). The authors also see an exponential growth in litigation and refer to 
figures of the Sabin Center for Climate Change at Columbia University and the Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science. In the two 
decades from 1986 to 2006, there had only been a handful of cases worldwide on environmental liability and 
climate change. However, in the 10 years from 2010 to 2020 there were over 1,000 cases.19 Cases before the court 
concern mainly civil law cases often brought against a parent company for harms which took place through 
the activities of its subsidiary, and raise questions of parent company liability and duty of care. However, one 
can question whether social considerations play a fundamental role in the ESG-context. This asks for more 
practice-oriented analyses. 
In the European Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth of 8 March 2018 explicit reference 
is made to methods of developing and disclosing sustainability strategies, including appropriate due diligence 
throughout the supply chain, and measurable sustainability targets. But there is no further exploration of the 
social dimension. And although the European Parliament called on the Commission, in its May 2018 Report on 
Sustainable Finance, to provide a legislative proposal for an overarching, mandatory due diligence framework 
including a duty of care, this duty is focusing mainly on climate and other environmental risks. In the report, 
only one sentence is dedicated to minimum standards on ESG risks that should include minimum social 
standards for investments encompassing workers’ rights, health and safety standards. This is in stark contrast 
to the demand for binding EU-legislation that increases protection for individuals and communities, workers 
and their representatives, human rights defenders, and the environment, which was formulated in October 
2019 by 80 NGOs and trade unions.20
In recent years, some scholars have assessed the due diligence practices and examined the impact of the regu-
latory requirements for the company conduct (own operation and through the chain).21 Remarkably, the most 
outspoken conclusion is that because of the existing lack of regulatory or legal requirements to undertake 
due diligence, regulation is currently the least selected incentive for companies to undertaking due diligence. 
Other drivers, such as the current corona pandemic, have significant more influence. The rate of companies 
that, either in the 2020 financial statements or in the 2019 financial statements filed in 2020, mentioned their 
risk management initiatives, significantly increased.22 But even then, the wording speaks volumes, with all 
emphasis on monitoring risks and opportunities, not on compliance with fundamental social rights, such as 
equal treatment, dignity or fair working conditions. 
Good governance has been an object of international debate for years, with developments moving from a soft 
law approach to the request coming from the corporations of a regulation of their obligations related to human 
rights. This debate about the regulation of due diligence became topical at EU-level in the spring of 2020 with 
the announcement of EU Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders that the Commission wants to introduce 
rules for mandatory corporate environmental and human rights. A European legal framework was announced 
for both the due diligence obligation of business to prevent and mitigate business impacts on human rights 
and environment, and the access to remedy mechanisms allowing the enforceability of the parent company’s 
responsibility to monitor the behaviours of its affiliated companies and supply chain in third countries. The 
Commissioner presented the findings of the Commission study on options for regulating due diligence require-
ments, during a high-level online event hosted by the EU Parliament’s Responsible Business Conduct Working 
Group on 29 April 2020. The findings revealed that a majority of stakeholders was of the opinion that the current 
regimes of voluntary measures have failed to significantly change the way businesses manage their social, 
environmental and governance impacts. Moreover, the voluntary schemes do not provide remedy to victims. 
While the transposition of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ standard of due diligence 
into legal (binding) standards is increasingly being discussed in Member States, only one in three businesses 
in the EU are currently undertaking due diligence which takes into account all human rights and environmental 
impacts. A broad coalition of civil society organisations and trade unions strongly supported the release of the 
findings from this study on due diligence requirements through the supply chain. This coalition stated that 
the results affirm that voluntary measures are failing. They repeated that there is urgent need for regulatory 
19 http://climatecasechart.com/about/    
20 https://corporatejustice.org/final_cso_eu_due_diligence_statement_03.10.19-compressed.pdf 
21 The European Commission commissioned a study, with country reports, to a consortium (BI-ICL, Civic Consulting and LSE) that was published 
in January 2020, Study on due diligence requirements through the supply chain, Luxembourg. The synthesis report pays little attention to workers’ 
rights; the focus is on environmental and human rights issues. However, in the full report also workers’ rights are treated.
22 Datamaran signals after years of focus on the environment, that the pandemic has brought the ‘social’ aspects related to sustainability to the 
fore. 
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action at EU level in order to protect workers, communities, and the environment from systematic, ongoing and 
worsening human (social) rights and environmental impacts linked to the global supply chains of businesses 
and financial institutions.
In response, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs prepared a legislative own-initiative report 
on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability with recommendations to the EU Commission.23 The 
report, adopted in March 2021 with a large majority, sends a strong signal of the EP’s support for the intro-
duction of mandatory human rights due diligence. In September 2020, the JURI-committee of the European 
Parliament published the draft with recommendations and a proposal for a Directive aiming at preventing and 
mitigating adverse effects on human rights, environment, and governance, and to ensure that businesses can 
be held accountable for these impacts and that anyone who has suffered harm can effectively exercise their 
right to obtain a remedy. A Directive should cover all undertakings governed by the Law of a Member state or 
established in its territory, with a harmonised regime of the due diligence obligation extended to subsidiaries 
and supply chain operating outside the EU. It should comprise a specific penalty system articulated through 
Member States and an adaptation of the European rules on applicable law and jurisdiction to ensure the appli-
cability of the national laws resulting from the Directive and to overcome the limits of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, in claims of human rights violations committed in third countries by businesses. 
2.3  THE NATIONAL OUTLOOK
Sustainable investing has gone from a niche investment idea to attracting enough start capital to having an 
impact on global challenges at a meaningful scale (Morgan Stanley 2018). This contrasts with earlier periods. 
The question then is, what is in it for workers and trade unions? Is there a real regulatory tsunami going on 
or are we talking about a consultancy hype (Parsons et al. 2020)? And are we really on the road to replace the 
(tacit) facilitation of regime shopping business strategies to evade labour standards by enforceable respon-
sibility of companies for the working conditions of the suppliers’ workers in their entire transnational value 
chain?
The most remarkable due diligence regulation at national level in Europe is certainly the ‘Duty of Vigilance’ 
Law that was adopted in France in March 2017.24 The law is based on the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, setting out the obligations held not only by companies but also by states to 
identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks linked to business relationships and activities. 
Several scholars have shed a light on the content of this ‘duty of care’ regulation (Clerc 2021, Savourey 2020, 
Collinet 2020) and, in the meantime, a first legal action was initiated. NGOs used the law to file action against 
energy multinational Total SE for failing to monitor the methods used by its subcontractors in Uganda to 
acquire land.25 Also remarkable is a reference to the Act in an EWC-agreement (group Korian).   
The French ‘Duty of Vigilance’ act is the only legislative example to date which imposes a general mandatory 
due diligence requirement for human rights and environmental impacts. The law imposes a duty of vigilance 
on large companies (employing 5000 employees in France, or 10,000 globally). 
The law extends to the activities of French companies’ subsidiaries and subcontractors and business 
enterprises in the supply chain ‘with which the company maintains an established commercial rela-
tionship’. In order to discharge their legal duty, companies need to implement a ‘vigilance plan’ which 
should include reasonable measures to adequately identify risks and prevent serious violations of 
human rights and the environment (Smit et al 2020). 
The legislation seeks to prevent large companies from hiding behind their status as buyers. It establishes 
liability between the parent company of a corporation and its subsidiaries and subcontractors in the event 
of human or environmental rights violations. In short, it puts limits to the ‘corporate veil’ doctrine. Under 
this doctrine, companies were always seen as (a collection of) separate legal entities, even in case of parent 
23 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0073_EN.html 





companies and subsidiaries, and, as a consequence, a parent company could not be held liable for misbe-
haviour of the lower echelons of a production or services chain. The aim of the act is to prevent the risks and 
serious violations that activities of large French companies can generate with regard to human rights, workers’ 
health and the environment. The liability extends not only to the activities of the parent company, but also to 
subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers with which it has an established business relationship. Companies 
must publish an annual ‘duty of care’ or due diligence plan setting out a range of preventive measures. Vigilance 
plans must include reasonable measures adequate to identify risks and to prevent severe impacts on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, on the health and safety of individuals and on the environment, resulting 
from the activities of the company, its subsidiaries, suppliers and subcontractors. The plans must be prepared 
in collaboration with the stakeholders of the company and should cover a value chain assessment process, risk 
mapping, risk mitigation and preventive actions, alert mechanisms and monitoring systems on the effective 
and efficient implementation of measures. The alert mechanism must enable workers, NGOs and, for example, 
citizens living in the vicinity of a site or factory, to inform companies of any unidentified risks or adverse effects 
that may arise from their activities. The information must be open to the public and available on the company 
website and on a website that provides a list of companies covered by the law on duty of vigilance.26
Almost 4 years after the adoption, the assessment of the functioning of the law is still rather tentative. According 
to a list published in June 2020, 72 (or 27%) out of 265 identified companies that would be subject to the duty of 
vigilance had not published any vigilance plan over the last three years despite their legal obligation to do so. 
Among them are giants of the French economy such as McDonald’s France, Yves Rocher, Avril, Castorama, Euro-
Disney, Bigard, France Télévisions, KPMG, Picard (Bommier et al. 2020). Companies often deny that the size of 
the workforce goes beyond the threshold or they claim that this threshold only applies to the French territory. 
The duty of vigilance requires companies to identify and monitor risks and to act upon them through ongoing 
mitigation and prevention measures. However, the plans often are too general or vague, without giving a clear 
indication of the workplaces or the names of the entities where risks show up. The risk maps make no mention 
of serious environmental risks or threats of workers’ rights and therefore have an insufficient level of detail. 
Besides, alert systems are not always clearly located in the company (HR department or straight to the manage-
ment?). Even more fundamental is the critic that the act is too much an act on paper; a company with a plan 
in place to prevent risks is difficult to tackle. Sometimes, audit systems are too weak to protect workers and 
whistle-blowers.  
Some scholars conclude that, in order to ensure an effective implementation, France should give due reflec-
tion to the possibility of strengthening the law, namely by considering the opportunity to create and pass civil 
fines or criminal sanctions. Implementation of the law should also be backed by a list, prepared every year 
by the French authorities, of the companies that come within the scope of the Duty of Vigilance law (Sherpa 
2020). NGOs involved recommend at European level a public country-by-country reporting policy so that large 
companies need to publish each year a certain amount of information of general interest on their activities 
country by country (list of all their subsidiaries and activities, turnover, profits, taxes paid, number of employees, 
subsidies received, value of assets, number of sales and purchases). Others plead for a Directive at EU level 
that prescribes a ‘vigilance plan’ containing reasonable but adequate measures to identify risks and to prevent 
severe impacts on such rights. Such a Directive should include appropriate internal monitoring arrangements 
(such as a ‘vigilance committee’ with stakeholder representation, including trade unions and worker represent-
atives), proper external supervision (through a public supervisory agency tasked with setting up norms) and 
adequate remedies, including criminal sanctions, disgorgement of profits, and punitive damages (Clerc 2021).
26 https://vigilance-plan.org/ 
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3.1  SUBCONTRACTING LIABILITY FOR LABOUR STANDARDS,  
     SOCIAL SECURITY AND TAXES
In general, subcontracting liability measures regarding wages, and health & safety at the workplace have been 
established at national level with the primary aim to protect both fair competition and the workers engaged in 
a subcontracting chain. Next to that, subcontracting liability with regard to social security premiums and taxes 
exists and has the predominant aim to protect the state and social insurance funds income.
At the level of international law, there is a lack of clear arrangements concerning the liability in production 
chains (Vytopil 2015). Most often the ‘corporate veil’ doctrine, according to which separate legal entities such as 
parent and subsidiary companies are liable only for their own infringements exempts a parent company from 
liability for obligations of a subsidiary – even if it holds 100 percent of the subsidiary’s shares – and even less 
so for breaches of the law by subcontractors.
Regarding the EU level, several Directives have been adopted with regard to cross-border subcontracting liability. 
For an extensive comprehensive overview, we refer to studies conducted in 2008, 2012 and 2016, analysing 
European legislation on the legal systems in the Member States, revealing loopholes as well as fraudulent 
practices (Houwerzijl 2008, Jorens 2012, Haidinger 2016). The most recent elaborated update of such practices 
and possible solutions, was made in 2017 in a report commissioned by the European Parliament (hereafter: the 
2017 EP study).27 It provides an overview of liability provisions in place at EU level and a comprehensive picture 
of the legal systems in place in five EU Member States regarding liability in subcontracting chains.28 
At the EU level, the Employers Sanctions Directive 2009/52/EC provides - at least in theory - the most 
far-reaching subcontracting liability measures. The Directive introduces chain liability (to the next interme-
diate contractor higher up in a layer of subcontracting) in sectors without chain liability. This subcontracting 
liability is solely targeted against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive aims to 
reduce the attractiveness for employers to employ workers who are illegally staying in the EU by introducing a 
liability regime. Article 8 stipulates a direct joint and several liability for the contractor of which the employer 
is a direct subcontractor. Moreover, if the employer is a subcontractor, the main contractor and any interme-
diate subcontractor may also be liable to pay fines, if they knew that the employing subcontractor employed 
irregular migrants. This establishes a full chain liability, which implies in principle the strongest protection 
and highest preventive effect as possible, because every link of the subcontracting chain is a possible debtor. 
However, the wording of article 8.2 suggest that all links must have knowledge (‘the main contractor and any 
intermediate subcontractor, where they knew that the employing subcontractor employed illegally staying 
third-country nationals’). Another interpretation in sense of a liability of those in the chain, who know apart 
from those who do not, is thus possible. Next to that, Member States may ‘water down’ the chain liability by 
exempting the contractor that has undertaken due diligence obligations (article 8.3). According to the 2017 EP 
study, this makes it very easy to escape liability if the employer possesses and presents a written statement 
in which the direct subcontractor confirms that no third country nationals illegally staying are employed. In 
such a case, it will be even more difficult to prove any knowledge of the contractor or other links in the chain. 
27  A. Heinen, A. Müller, B. Kessler, Liability in Subcontracting Chains: National Rules and the Need for a European Framework, Brussels: June 2017, 
commissioned by the European Parliament.
28  Germany, Italy, Hungary, The Netherlands, Poland.
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The main focus in this overview is on the implementation of the PWD Enforcement Directive 2014/67, which 
includes in Article 12 a provision on cross-border joint and several liability for the payment of wages in subcon-
tracting chains. The Enforcement Directive stipulates a concept of a direct joint and several liability, extending 
liability to one link up in the chain only, in respect of any outstanding net remuneration (according to the 
minimum rates of pay of the host state) and/or contributions due to common funds or institutions of social 
partners regulated by law or collective agreement (as far as these are covered by Article 3.1 PWD). While Member 
States are required to introduce such subcontracting liability in the construction sector and cover at least 
unpaid net remuneration corresponding to the minimum rates of pay (Article 12.1), they may provide for it in 
any sector, also for more tiers than only towards the direct contractor and with a broader scope than minimum 
rates of pay (Article 12.2 and 12.4). Instead of such a system of subcontracting liability, Member States may take 
other appropriate enforcement measures (Article 12.6).29 All these measures have to be taken on a non-discrim-
inatory and proportionate basis. A ‘flanking’ measure which would strengthen the liability instrument is laid 
down in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. This provision enables trade unions and other third parties, 
such as associations, organisations and other legal entities having a legitimate interest in compliance with 
the PWD, to engage, on behalf or in support of the posted workers, and with their approval, in any judicial or 
administrative proceedings.
In their implementation, some countries introduced new measures on joint and several liability, in particular in 
the context of public procurement and regarding temporary agency work. Nevertheless, considerable differences 
were observed in the EP study of 2017 in terms of scope between the Member States examined: While Germany, 
Italy30 and the Netherlands have very far reaching and elaborated systems of chain liability, sometimes even 
covering all wage components, Poland, the UK and in part Hungary are pursuing a policy strictly according to 
the minimum requirements of the Enforcement Directive.31 
In line with previous assessments, the authors of the EP study in 2017 assessed the effectiveness of the Enforce-
ment Directive chain liability measure as limited, since it is relatively easy to circumvent by inserting a letter 
box company.32 Moreover, the provision includes an escape clause lacking any definition of due diligence, 
which results in a wide margin of interpretation and therefore legal uncertainty.33 Furthermore, liability is still 
restricted to the construction sector despite clear evidence of the practice of subcontracting spreading on to 
other sectors like transportation, meat processing, agriculture and other labour intensive sectors (albeit that 
Member States are free to expand the scope to these sectors).
According to the 2019 report of the European Commission,34 based on replies to a questionnaire sent to the 
Expert Committee on Posting of Workers, the liability rules have not yet been frequently applied in practice as 
there are no relevant court cases. Nonetheless, several Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and France) indicated that the intro-
duction of these rules has increased the effective protection of the workers’ rights in subcontracting chains. A 
remarkable observation is that 15 of the current 27 Member States seem to apply provisions of subcontracting 
liability only to foreign service providers, although it is clearly stipulated that it is not allowed to set up a system 
of subcontracting liability which applies only to cross-border service providers, as this would directly discrim-
inate against those service providers.35 Such system could discourage customers’ final clients and contractors 
to contract or subcontract with undertakings established in other Member States.36 
29 Only Denmark and Finland made use of that, according to the EC report of 2019.
30 Re Italy the assessment showed very strict liability rules, but since foreign subcontractors and posting are less relevant than in other Member 
States and Italy is ‘traditionally facing issues with the enforcement of rules’, there were doubts regarding the preventive impact in reality.
31 The report (2016) Transnational posting of workers within the EU. Guidelines for administrative cooperation and mutual assistance in the light 
of Directive 67/2014/EU ENACTING (VS /2015/0013), also contains an examination of the subcontracting liability rules in Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Romania.
32 However, due to the at that time recent implementation in mid-2016, there was no reliable data or practical experience with the flanking meas-
ures of Art. 4 and 11 of the Enforcement Directive.
33 In contrast, paragraph (2) of the first draft of Art. 12 provided a prestructured due diligence proposing how a reasonable due diligence could be 
performed and implemented into national legislation.
34 Brussels, 25.09.2019, COM (2019) 426 final.
35 National law on liability rules in Austria, Estonia, Hungary and Italy seem to apply to any situation (not only subcontracting) when an employer 
engages into a contract with a service provider established in another Member State.
36 COM (2019) 426 final, p. 17-18. These 15 MS are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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3.2  THE NATIONAL OUTLOOK
Already before the adoption of the PWD in 1996, Germany introduced a chain liability regime for the construc-
tion sector, which was gradually expanded to other ‘high risk’ sectors and linked to the payment of wages in 
extended collective agreements. Since the entering into force of a statutory minimum wage in 2015, the chain 
liability instrument applies regardless of specific economic sectors. Pursuant to Art. 14 of the national Posting 
of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz: AEntG) in conjunction with Art. 13 of the Minimum Wage Act 
(Mindestlohngesetz: MiLoG), the contractor is held liable for any depth concerning (minimum-) wages as well 
as social fund payments. According to Art. 8 AEntG the liability applies irrespective of any fault or responsi-
bility. Moreover, this liability applies irrespective of any preventive measures of the contractor, even the most 
thorough due diligence will not prevent possible liability as there is no escape clause. As a result, unpaid 
workers are entitled to claim their net wages directly from the contractor without the need of prior action 
against their employer. The only clear gap in the protection is that the final client is not deemed to fall under 
the scope of MiLoG and AEntG in a majority of the cases.37 In particular in the context of public procurement 
this is a missed opportunity, since it exempts the public tenderers from liability.
Temporary agency workers (TAW) are normally excluded from the scope of the chain liability, since the contract 
between a TAW-agency and the user undertaking is considered a commercial contract. However, in subcon-
tracting chains an exception applies if a TAW-agency has been commissioned by a direct contractor or subcon-
tractor of the principal in order to fulfil contractual obligations. Although an exception, this should apply 
to almost every subcontracting chain involving TAW-agencies as subcontractors. A more general reform in 
2017 in Germany enhanced the position of TAW-workers and tackled several abusive forms of TAW such as 
the phenomenon of so called ‘Chain Leasing’ (Kettenverleih) in the framework of subcontracting. This has 
been made impossible under the revised law. With effect of the 1st of April 2017, ‘Chain Leasing’ is prohibited 
according to § 1 AÜG. Temporal workers may be assigned by their contractual employer only, not by third 
parties. A violation is sanctioned with a high fine and the employment relationship of the agency worker will be 
conversed in an open-ended employment contract with the contracting user undertaking (§ 10a AÜG). A second 
circumventive practice that was tackled by the reform is ‘hidden supply of temporary workers’ (‘verdeckte Arbe-
itnehmerüberlassung’). This often involves pseudo self-employed workers.  
In earlier research (Cremers 2019), there was already reference to the Austrian act on tackling social fraud 
(‘Sozialbetrugsbekämpfungsgesetz’, SBBG) that defines artificial corporate legal entities or ‘bogus’ companies 
(‘Scheinfirmen’). The legislation uses the term for corporate legal entities without assets (i.e., letterbox 
companies, often with registered offices in empty premises). The sole purpose of these firms is registering 
employees with social security institutions, without the intention of paying any taxes or social security contri-
bution. The firms appear in ‘subcontracting pyramids’ (extended chains of subcontractors) and in extended 
corporate networks (at national and at transnational level). Combined with the Act tackling Wage and Social 
Dumping (‘Lohn- und Sozialdumping-Bekämpfungsgesetz’, LSD-BG) that came into force on 1 January 2017 this 
legislation, with a strong focus on the construction industry, can be applied in situations of subcontracting. A 
key provision is the liability of the client/user undertaking. Pursuant to § 9 LSD-BG remuneration claims for 
employees from other countries who are posted or hired out to work in the Austrian construction industry 
are secured. However, this liability is limited to the immediate client, unless obvious evidence of fraud was 
available at the start. The legislator can apply in severe cases of wage dumping not only substantial penalties, 
but also the withdrawal of trade licenses.
In the Netherlands, liability in the chain is to a certain extent covered by provisions in the generally binding 
collective agreements. Several sectoral collective agreements that are generally binding, for instance in the 
construction sector and affiliate trades, the metal sector and the international transport sector, contain an 
important reference to the obligation to ascertain the compliance with the hard core of the provisions in the 
prevailing sectoral agreements by hiring firms and subcontractors. The main contractor must ascertain that 
the involved workers receive the wages and allowances to which they are entitled according to these sectoral 
agreements. The main user undertaking is responsible for the correct application of the prevailing agreement 
in the sector and has to inform the subcontractor and/or agency about the concerned provisions. Non-com-
pliance or default with this duty to inform and verify provides the trade unions with the right to go to court 
37 2017 EP study, p. 74. Also, extensively on the so-called “Mall of Berlin” case (Arbeitsgericht Berlin, Urteil vom 03.05.2017 – Az. 14 Ca 14814/16): 
Vladimir Bogoeski 2016.
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and order compensation through civil proceedings. This duty is also prescribed in the generally binding collec-
tive agreement of the temporary agency sector in article 16 of that agreement, which says that the temporary 
agency worker is entitled to the prevailing remuneration in the user firm.38 There is, in the meantime, case-law 
that penalises this non-compliance with awarding damages.39 Case-law also has defined that the duty goes 
beyond basic information provision and presumes real verification.40
In the slipstream of the implementation of the revised PWD, Sweden adopted a Bill in November 2020 that 
introduces a so-called ‘economic employer’ concept in Swedish tax law.41 The legislation entered into force on 
1 January 2021. It results in Swedish tax liability for many short-term workers and business travellers employed 
abroad, who have not previously been subject to tax in Sweden. This new employer concept means that the 
assessment of who is considered the employer – from a tax perspective – is now based on the beneficiary of 
the employee’s labour. This leads to changes in the ‘183-days-rule’ which Sweden applies in line with Art. 15 of 
the OECD tax convention. Consequently, the 183-day rule usually results in tax exemptions for foreign individ-
uals for up to six months, if the employee remains employed by the foreign employer in its own jurisdiction 
and if this employer actually pays the salary. According to the new legislation, the 183-day rule will no longer 
apply if the employee’s activities are considered as hiring of labour to a Swedish company. The definition of 
‘hiring of labour’ for non-resident employers includes situations where:
• the non-resident employer directly or indirectly makes an individual available to perform labour;
• the client’s business is located in Sweden; and
• the labour is performed as an integrated part of the client’s activities and under the client’s control and 
management.
Thus, the new legislation will result in Swedish taxation from day one for many foreign employees working 
temporarily in Sweden. This means that also foreign employers without a permanent establishment in Sweden 
will now need to withhold preliminary tax for their employees (to the extent that the work has been carried 
out in Sweden) and have to comply with reporting obligations such as registering with the Swedish tax admin-
istration STA. An exemption applies if the work in Sweden does not exceed 15 consecutive days and is for a 
maximum of 45 days per calendar year. Further, if the 45-day limit is exceeded, the exceeding days only should 
be subject to determine whether the work carried out in Sweden can be seen as the hiring of labour.




41 This part of the report draws on New rules on posting of workers in Sweden - Newsletters - International Law Office  
SUBCONTRACTING AND SOCIAL LIABILITY
23
4.1  DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL,  
     SOCIAL AND OTHER NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Measured to the large number of publications in recent decades on non-financial reporting one might easily get 
the impression that the publication of societal impact and consequences of corporate behaviour is increasing. 
The interest in this information, notably after the financial crisis has led to new initiatives in reporting frame-
works, codes, rules, practices, and handbooks that guide the business environment through the process of 
disclosure. In general terms, the applicable regulatory framework and the societal context in which a firm 
operates, the dialogue with its stakeholders and other factors, such as transparency on ethical choices and 
applied norms and standards lead the way. However, there are no universally agreed mandatory objectives 
and standards for such disclosure. Companies have the choice and apply different types of reporting, whether 
through separated reports dedicated to particular subject matters, themes, objectives or requirements, through 
integrated reports that cover all subject matters or through mixed forms with intertwined reports. 
Non-financial reporting, especially the disclosure of sustainability items, is becoming standard practice for 
large and mid-size companies; it is however, far less common among small and mid-size companies. Moreover, 
it is not quantity that counts, the key question is what the quality of this type of information is. Assessments 
often reveal that companies use generic, vague and non-specific language and terminology. And in general, 
social key performance indicators are less prevalent than the more established environmental and human 
rights parameters. Sustainable developments goals are seen as a roadmap to global transformation. Circular 
business approaches that deal with sustainability are more and more presented as ‘big business’, with new 
and better growth and profit opportunities, going far beyond environmental, social and governance reporting, 
presenting a vision for reshaping entire industries towards long-term value creation. Social reporting is less 
marketable and social indicators are often limited to reporting on diversity in recruitment and to the safety 
and health of workers.42 
Over the last decades, a new branch of advice and assistance with the development of a reporting strategy and 
external disclosure processes has emerged: business consultancies that provide reference (or even complete 
blueprints) for companies that want to disclose in reports.43 This can lead to copy-paste products or to an 
annual ritual of reporting based on ‘boilerplate disclosures’, i.e. generic statements that are not specifically 
tailored to the individual company and the risks it faces (SASB 2017). In an early assessment, several of these 
statements with great similarity were found, probably prepared by the same consultancies that companies 
42 Interestingly, assessments reveal differences between continents. For instance, the State of Disclosure in 2017 report of the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board Foundation (SASB) says: At U.S.-based firms, boards of directors often view maximization of share-holder value as the 
number one priority of their fiduciary duty. Meanwhile, companies in other parts of the world, most significantly in Europe, typically consider the 
interests of a broader group of stakeholders, including employees and clients. As a result of this difference, such companies may be more cultur-
ally attuned to their sustainability impacts and more likely to disclose relevant information (SASB 2018), https://www.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/
state-of-disclosure-2017/ 
43 For instance, the online platform Reporting Exchange (www.reportingexchange.com) records details of reporting provisions that directly or indi-
rectly influence the way in which companies report their information. Its Indicator Library organises, categorises and structures the indicators that 
companies commonly apply for external reporting. 
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hired in (Cremers 2013). Critics talk about companies that are engaged in ‘impact washing’, with as a result 
that their reporting claims to support sustainable goals while being implicated in conduct that may belie that 
support.44
ShareAction, an NGO that mobilises investors to take action to improve labour standards, tackle the climate 
crisis, and address pressing global health issues, such as childhood obesity, published a report that digs a bit 
deeper in the commitment to human and labour rights in the policy documents and reporting of companies 
(ShareAction 2020). As part of the ambition for 2030, the UN Sustainable Development Goals make a commit-
ment under Goal 8 to end modern slavery, ensuring the protection of labour rights and safe conditions for 
all workers, whilst one of the targets for Goal 16 includes significantly reducing all forms of violence. Share-
Action’s assessment looked at 75 of the world’s largest asset managers and their performance on responsible 
investment, with one of the three areas of focus being on human rights (alongside climate change and biodi-
versity). The assessment found that the industry’s money is overwhelmingly being used in a way that at best 
neglects human and labour rights abuses and at worst contributes to them. While 76% of the world’s largest 
asset managers say they have a commitment to human rights, if assessed, just 4% of managers make firm and 
specific policy commitments on human and labour rights. The main reference to labour issues is financial risk, 
most commonly related to occupational health and safety, and operational risks, such as staff unrest due to 
poor labour practices, poor staff retention, and poor productivity.
Other studies confirm the conclusion that the main focus is on the ‘E’, with social reporting lagging behind. 
Three charities (Friends Provident Foundation, Joffe Trust and Blagrave Trust 2021) concluded in their ESG 
impact assessment of the investment sector that social issues were in some cases not covered at all. According 
to the NGOs, the ‘S of ESG’ should be placed more firmly on the agenda. Key social issues, from decent work 
and working conditions, including the promotion of fair pay, to workforce and management diversity and the 
responsible payment of tax require far greater attention and integration.
From a broader perspective of the commitment to human rights instruments, an assessment in 2017 revealed 
that the application of human rights standards lacked coherence across the EU, due to an uneven adoption 
and implementation of international human rights instruments. Although the EU has endorsed the main 
international instruments aimed at promoting corporate social responsibility, there is a divide in EU policy 
between civil and political rights, which are enforceable and a priority, and economic, social and cultural rights. 
Moreover, the same authors write that there remains a considerable gap in translating the endorsement into 
concrete support, and in increasing awareness and compliance with these instruments by the EU itself, by the 
Member States, in third countries, and by businesses operating within the EU and global markets (FRAME 2017). 
Another weakness is that much of the delivery of the EU’s commitment depends on the willingness of Member 
States to play along. Internally, some Member States are implementing reforms that are plainly averse to such 
commitment, and the EU currently struggles with putting effective instruments into place to tackle these devel-
opments. Too often human rights considerations are de facto superseded by ‘hard interests’, ignoring increased 
risk of poverty, widening inequalities, or an erosion of social protection. This goes hand-in-hand with a rela-
tively low level of knowledge of the EU’s commitment among EU officials, rigidly organised in silos, who struggle 
to reflect on cross-cutting issues in their specialised administrations. Coherence requires the coordination of 
economic, social, and environmental policies at the internal and external level. All levels of power, from EU 
Member States to EU institutions and other EU bodies, need to act such that they do not offset the commitment 
through contradicting policies. This requires a ‘rights-based’ approach, instead of a rather piecemeal approach, 
aligning policies vertically between the EU and its Member States as well as horizontally among EU institutions 
such as the Commission Directorates-General, or Council Working Groups.
44 According to an article in the Responsible Investor (2-10-2020): ‘Most standardized information provided by companies covers only “traditional” 
ESG performance metrics, e.g., carbon emissions, water consumption and employee injury rates. SDG-related reporting is generally anecdotal, per-
taining to specific projects and initiatives and lacking a full assessment of companies’ impact on society and the environment throughout the value 
chain.’ https://www.responsible-investor.com/articles/assessing-company-alignment-with-the-un-sdgs 
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4.2  THE REGULATION OF NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING
The reporting task can be based on mandatory legal requirements or fit in a voluntary framework that provides 
the reporting entity with guidance and suggested codes. The ‘binding’ character varies in character; most 
requirements can be seen as ‘soft law’, with (only) normative expectations and standards (Global Reporting 
Initiative 2018, Alliance for Corporate Transparency 2019, EFRAG 2021). 
One of the key principles used in monitoring is the mainstream instrument, generally applied in corporate 
governance, of ‘comply or explain’. Due to the voluntary nature and the lack of stringent monitoring mech-
anisms, adherents often do not tend to adopt costly steps to comply with requirements. Instead, companies 
rather adopt symbolic, low-cost steps to convey the impression of obligation compliance. Although it looks 
as if, in recent years, a surge in legislation on corporate reporting has taken place, there remains an absence 
of concrete legislation on mandatory due diligence on labour standards. Almost all legal reporting schemes, 
formulated in mandatory non-prescriptive requirements, prescribe the themes of the envisaged information, 
but do not prescribe the required content in details.45 
The following scheme summarises some prominent guidelines and principles that are applied. 
45 To mention a few jurisdictions that enacted legislation: the 2015 Modern Slavery Act in the UK, the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law, the 
French 2017 Duty of Vigilance Law, and the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive.
Human and labour rights frameworks – overview of guidelines and principles
UNITED NATIONS GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (UNGPS)
The UNGPs are a set of guidelines for states and companies to prevent, address and remedy human 
rights abuses committed in business operations. The UNGPs are not legally binding, but function as 
normative expectations. The UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework is a comprehensive guidance 
for companies on how to report on their respect for human rights. The Framework is supported by an 
implementation guidance for reporting companies and an assurance guidance for internal auditors and 
external assurance providers.
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (UNGC)
The UNGC is comprised of 10 social and environmental principles (six refer specifically to human and 
labour rights) aimed at mobilising companies to participate and report in line with progress on these 
principles. UNGC aims to engage and exclude companies based on breaches. Firms that fail to report 
progress on the UNGC are delisted, and companies that are not eligible to join due to the nature of their 
core business activities are not listed. 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR STANDARDS
ILO-standards set out basic principles and rights at work. The conventions (of which eight so-called 
fundamental conventions cover the ‘core’ labour standards) are legally binding international treaties 
that may be ratified ILO by Member States. In addition, there are ILO-recommendations serving as 
non-binding guidelines, often to supplement a convention by providing more detailed guidelines on 
how it could be applied. 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations that cover a range of respon-
sible business thematic areas, including employment and industrial relations. They provide non-binding 
principles and standards for responsible business conduct for multinational corporations, including 
investors, operating in or from countries adhering to the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. Non-compliance with OECD guidelines can lead to grievances being filed.
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EU Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial reporting, formulated as an amendment of Directive 2013/34/EU on 
annual and consolidated financial statements, prescribes large listed EU companies and financial corporations 
to disclose information on environmental, social, human rights, bribery and anti-corruption matters in order 
to enhance the consistency and comparability of non-financial information disclosed throughout the EU. The 
disclosure should contribute to a better understanding of a company’s position, performance, development 
and impacts. Companies falling under the scope of the Directive are requested (in line with article 3.1 of the 
Directive 2014/95/EU) to include a non-financial statement that discloses information on their business model, 
policies and due diligence and the outcomes of their policies, principal risks, and key performance indicators 
(KPIs) with respect to environmental, social and employee matters, as well as bribery and anti-corruption 
matters, relevant to their business. The Directive does not prescribe the exact content; to formulate this is up 
to a company’s discretion.
According to research of the Alliance for Corporate Transparency (2020), the quality of corporate reporting 
practices varies among EU companies and across Member States. Notably, most undertakings in all Member 
States fail to disclose relevant, material, meaningful and comparable sustainability information, underscoring 
the need to clarify and specify reporting requirements for companies. The Alliance has criticised the lack of 
clear definitions which specify information and KPIs companies must disclose, as well as the specific matters 
they should address. Besides, the general reporting requirements listed in the Directive allow contradicting 
interpretations. This undermines the objective of the law to increase the consistency and comparability of ESG 
information. 
The European Commission announced in 2020 to review the non-financial reporting directive as part of the 
strategy to strengthen the foundations for sustainable investment. At the moment of writing the Directive’s 
revision is discussed.46 Several stakeholders have published their opinion on the reform proposal after the 
Commission launched a public consultation. As the legal consequences are yet unclear, this is not further 
elaborated upon in detail in the frame of this research. In the meantime, important proposals for a revision of 
the directive have been formulated. In the frame of this research, we refer to these proposals (i.e., EFRAG 2021). 
4.3  DISCLOSURE OF (SUBCONTRACTING) CHAIN INFORMATION 
However, what is assessed here is the reference in the non-financial reporting area to liability aspects in chains 
of production or services, with subcontracting entities and/or subsidiaries. Directive 2013/34/EU on annual 
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports only refers to due diligence when 
sourcing minerals. The amending Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial reporting makes reference to subcon-
tracting issues in its preambles. Recital 6 of the Directive stipulates that the non-financial statement should 
also ‘include information on the due diligence processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, 
where relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to identify, prevent and 
mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts’. And recital 8 adds ‘The risks of adverse impact may stem from 
the undertaking’s own activities or may be linked to its operations, and, where relevant and proportionate, 
its products, services and business relationships, including its supply and subcontracting chains.’ This can be 
read as a provision that aims to ensure that the outsourcing of production does not imply the outsourcing 
of responsibility. However, this notion is not included in the articles of the Directive and, therefore, the legal 
character is weak. In the core text, no further reference is made to subcontracting. Moreover, the wording is 
cautious and non-committal, with conditionalities such as ‘relevant and proportionate’ and reference to ‘undue 
additional administrative burdens’ for small and medium-sized undertakings. 
A second aspect that is important for the purpose of our research, is the scope of the disclosure: does it cover 
the activity as a whole or is it limited to a single economic entity. Directive 2013/34/EU on annual and consol-
idated financial statements prescribes that consolidated financial statements should present the activities of 
a parent undertaking and its subsidiaries as a single economic entity (a group) as soon as the average number 
of employees during the financial year exceeds 250 employees. Undertakings controlled by the parent under-
taking should be considered as subsidiary undertakings. A subsidiary undertaking which is itself a parent 
undertaking should also draw up consolidated financial statements. Nevertheless, Member States can exempt 
such a parent undertaking from the obligation to draw up such consolidated financial statements in certain 
46 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en 
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circumstances, provided that its members and third parties are sufficiently protected. The requirement to 
prepare consolidated financial statements is formulated in article 22 of Directive 2013. Directive 2014/95/EU 
does not speak about single economic entities. However, recital 14, which exempts SMEs, stipulates that the 
obligation to disclose a non-financial statement should apply only to those large undertakings which are 
public-interest entities and to those public-interest entities which are parent undertakings of a large group, in 
each case having an average number of employees in excess of 500, in the case of a group on a consolidated 
basis. Article 29a lays down the content of the consolidated non-financial statement containing information to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the group’s development, performance, position and impact of 
its activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, 
anti-corruption and bribery matters. This should be formulated, among others, in a description of the policies 
pursued by a group, a listing of principal risks related to those matters linked to the group’s operations and 
how the group manages those risks. Where a group does not pursue policies in relation to one or more of 
those matters, the consolidated non-financial statement shall provide a clear and reasoned explanation for 
not doing so. The reporting of activities of subsidiaries is mentioned in recital 3 of the Directive 2014/95/EU, 
where it is said that an undertaking which is a subsidiary undertaking shall be exempted from the obligation to 
report if that undertaking and its subsidiary undertakings are included in the consolidated management report 
or the separate report of another undertaking. 
Critics have noted that the practical implementation and application is problematic (Emons 2021). Several 
NGOs and scholars evaluated the functioning of the EU Directive and concluded that companies’ reporting at 
large is insufficient; reports are not presented in an accessible way and information on risks, impacts and their 
management is often incomplete or lacking. Others have assessed the weaknesses of the Directive especially 
regarding the monitoring of the reporting and the enforcement of duties. In general terms, most critics speak 
about the need to create more clarity, consistency and comparability across the value chain. Clear indicators 
are needed that underpin the level of compliance and can be used to assess a particular situation before 
designing policy, to benchmark a policy for monitoring purposes, or as a control variable when evaluating 
policy. Only then, evaluations of the impacts of an existing or a future measure can take place in a transparent 
way. 
As a complete assessment of the Directive is not subject of this study, we will withdraw from a detailed review 
and pinpoint the further analysis to subcontracting and chain liability issues.  
4.4  THE NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND THE PLANNED REVIEW
Directive 2014/95/EU neither introduces nor requires the use of a non-financial reporting standard or framework, 
nor does it impose detailed disclosure requirements such as lists of indicators per sector. Most Member States 
implemented the lean and flexible character of the Directive without providing further details on the types of 
policies that may be reported on, or how their outcomes could be measured. Several Member States intro-
duced the so-called ‘Safe Harbour Principle’ according to which a company may, in exceptional cases, refrain 
from providing information if disclosure of this particular information is likely to cause significant damage to 
the business in the course of ongoing negotiations or litigation. Also, the notion that information on business 
relationships should only be included in the report when ‘relevant and proportionate’ (as prescribed by the 
Directive) was welcomed by most Member States. 
After the implementation, only the Italian legislation explicitly referred to the notion in the Directive that 
business relationships include supply chains and subcontractors and France made reference to a Duty of Care 
of parent companies and ordering companies, including the reporting of outsourced work and of social and 
environmental responsibility in relation to suppliers and subcontractors (Frank Bold 2017). 
The European Commission has admitted that after the national implementation in 2018, the non-financial 
information disclosed by companies does not adequately meets the needs of the intended users. In the EC 
consultation launched in the frame of a planned drafting of a revision of the Directive, questions were raised 
related to the narrow scope of the Directive and the possible exemption of subsidiaries. The Commission 
is aware of the fact that these exemptions limit the information about impacts on society and the envi-
ronment, thus undermining the ability of stakeholders of such exempted subsidiaries to hold the involved 
forms accountable for their impacts on society and the environment, especially at local and national level. 
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Special attention is paid to the way in which companies address fundamental rights and manage related risks, 
including in their supply chains. The aim of the revision is ‘to have indirect but significant positive impacts on 
social issues, for example on labour standards, non-discrimination and social inclusion’ by the introduction of 
additional reporting requirements.47
Despite their rather weak legal character, the idea that the provisions in relation to principal risk are intended 
to include supply chain factors, as well as the company’s own operations has gained ground in recent years. 
But overall, most attention is still given to practices related to, for instance, the supply of raw material. An 
approach from the perspective of a supply of services or products by independent subcontractors is less 
common. Engagement regarding supply chains and subcontracting, paying attention to human and worker 
rights, such as the ILO core conventions and labour standards, stays weak (Friends Provident Foundation 2020). 
A more detailed assessment from the workers’ perspective of national experiences reveals that the reporting 
potentially could contain valuable information, though not in the current or expected form based on the 
requirements set out in the Directive.
Decent reporting on (fundamental) labour standards and workers’ rights has to deal with both, internal 
employees (freedom of association, non-discrimination and health & safety) and external workers (the moni-
toring of social factors and aspects in the supply chain). It is not only a written proof of firms’ commitment, 
but should also inform about the concrete implementation (Abriata 2020). Trade union representatives and 
workers’ representatives at company level in all investigated countries criticise the fact that even though 
Directive 2014/95/EU refers to extensive information, the resulting reports present hardly any information on 
the sensitive matters which they are the most interested in. Often, data provided are unclear, sometimes crucial 
information is omitted, especially on subcontracting and/or the supply chain. Interviewees in an EU-wide 
project perceived the reporting exercise as a part of a company’s marketing and communication strategy for 
meeting the expectations of the financial community and rating agencies, rather than as a true accountability 
tool (DimasoLab 2018). The conclusions drawn in that project were that uniformity and comparability have to 
be guaranteed through the use of recognised common international and national reporting standards. Further-
more, information about the supply chain and subcontracting should be obligatory, with clear legal definitions. 
For workers’ representatives, comparability would significantly increase the value of the given information and 
enlarge possibilities to utilise it. 
Over the years, the EU has developed in theory a strong commitment to fundamental rights, culminating with 
the Treaty of Lisbon, which gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘Charter’) the same legal value as 
the EU Treaties and listed human rights among the Union’s foundational values. Developments in a number of 
Member States over the last decade demonstrate a necessity for the EU to monitor the rule of law and funda-
mental rights in Member States, as well as in its own policies. The focus on democracy, good governance and 
human and social rights and on the mechanisms to safeguard these values has to be worked out further in the 
EU-legislation on non-financial reporting. This also requires a broad involvement of non-state actors, including 
civil society and the socioeconomic partners.
47 The Impact assessment, the consultation document and a series of replies can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/
have-your-say/initiatives/12129-Revision-of-Non-Financial-Reporting-Directive 
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5.1  LEGAL PROVISIONS IN CHAINS
A basic question is whether the corporate governance legislation/regulation is developed into an appropriate 
tool to integrate environmental and social objectives in public and private investment decisions and, moreover, 
whether the evolution of good governance practices has kept pace with the consequences of the externali-
sation of labour that has taken place in the last decades. Given the dominant ideology of deregulation of the 
business environment, the answer is probably no. Board members have relatively wide discretion when making 
decisions on behalf of a company on sustainability issues, but incentives within existing corporate governance 
models too often prevent them from taking concrete steps to act on these intentions. And workers’ represent-
atives have only few legally binding provisions to counteract these models (Emons 2021).  
In recent decades, the focus has even narrowed from the broader sustainability notion to more exclusive envi-
ronmental issues, such as the environment and biodiversity preservation. Often the transformation required in 
our economy towards sustainability is underpinned with arguments that sustainable corporate performance 
equates with better long-term value-creation for the company. In this kind of reasoning, financial arguments 
still prevail over societal effects and social values. Currently, this overshadows important social policies and 
issues like the enforcement of labour standards and the promotion of decent work, job security, excessive use 
of self-employed non-employees, gender inequality and widening income gaps, racial and social discrimina-
tion and the control of supply chains and associated risks. 
In general terms, the more complicated a production and services chain is in cases of sub-contracting, the 
more difficult it is to establish legal responsibility for labour standards and employment rights along the chain 
of subsidiaries, suppliers and subcontractors. Chains are kept complex in part to shield the main firms from 
liability for economic risks and labour obligations. The liability of parent companies for the legal transactions 
of their subsidiary companies in transnational cases is also often neither regulated by statute nor recognised 
by courts. For instance, the lack of clarity in the scope of due diligence obligations of a parent company toward 
human rights violations of its subsidiary companies means that even in the most extreme cases, victims of 
violent repression have no legal entitlement to justice and reparation from the parent company. Therefore ‘it is 
unsatisfactory, but not surprising, that these companies are difficult to hold legally accountable’ for violations 
committed by their supplier companies (ECCHR 2014). 
Effective statutory provisions regarding a company’s due diligence obligations in supplying companies and 
subcontractors are scarce and it might also be very problematic to properly react to violations committed by 
one of the many hundreds or thousands of supplier companies that corporations have to deal with. In such 
a situation, it is not easy to find resources for pressuring the management to incentivise its subsidiaries and 
suppliers to act in a responsible way. Moreover, there is a clear lack of established procedures to operate across 
borders and limited understanding about which authorities are involved, and which procedures to follow, 
for instance when dealing with complex subcontracting chains that operate across many different countries. 
However, a subsidiary is more than a technical part of a parent company and not all subcontracting chains 
are far away from the core business. Outsourcing of production stages, subcontracting based on a division of 
labour or on specialisation, and the externalisation of labour recruitment through agencies are most often 
centrally planned. And as a result, managing and control of the production process and other decisive direc-
tives come in such a case from the controlling undertaking at the top.
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5.2  PROBLEMS WITH COMPLIANCE AND REDRESS
Most regulations and standards are principles-based and enable a wide range of different frameworks to 
comply with. But almost all regulations lack legally binding effect with strong enforcement mechanisms and 
therefore, effective monitoring of standards across the value chain is problematic. There is still a large gap 
between corporates’ commitments and their concrete management and implementation, partly because it 
is too easy to get away with window dressing. Practitioners, such as trade union officers, workers represent-
atives and EWC-members, are often confronted with this gap between regulations of ‘good governance’ and 
the daily practice at the workplace. The disparity between the ‘spirit of the law’ and the ‘law in action’, i.e., 
the practical application of regulations, is time and again stemming from contradictions between several, in 
practice, intertwined (legal) areas concerning established business relations that are not treated in a coherent 
manner (for instance ‘identity’ versus ‘corporate veil’). This goes hand-in-hand with a relatively low level of 
integral knowledge inside EU institutions and other EU bodies, rigidly organised in silos, who struggle to reflect 
on cross-cutting issues in their specialised administrations. Coherence requires the coordination of economic, 
social, and environmental policies at the internal and external level. All levels of power need to act such that 
they do not offset the commitment through contradicting policies. Moreover, the disparity can be the result of 
the subordination of social rights to the economic freedoms and the prevalence on an everyday basis of the 
promotion of the ‘business environment’. It was already mentioned beyond that human rights considerations 
are too often de facto superseded by ‘hard interests’, ignoring increased risk of poverty, widening inequalities, 
or an erosion of social protection.
Related to compliance and enforcement this becomes manifest in:
a. A lack of preventive legal remedies at transnational level. The EU acquis does not provide for effective or 
dissuasive sanctions against the abuse of corporate entities in a cross-border context. In this respect, the 
acquis refers to national sanctioning mechanisms with national consequences. As a result, those affected 
can only rely on national judicial systems for preventive remedies, whilst the origins of the abuses are 
often the result of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ or ‘regime shopping’.
b. A lack of clear arrangements concerning the liability in production and services chains. Most often the 
corporate veil doctrine, according to which separate legal entities such as parent and subsidiary companies 
are liable only for their own infringements exempts a parent company from liability for obligations of a 
subsidiary – even if it holds 100 percent of the subsidiary’s shares – and makes it even less responsible for 
breaches of the law by supplier companies. 
c. The absence of measures to ensure that parent companies can be held accountable for violations 
committed (abroad) by subsidiaries or suppliers. In such a situation, clear attribution regulations are 
required and companies should have their own clearly defined due diligence obligations. However, in 
most countries, due diligence obligations of parent companies regarding subsidiaries and suppliers are 
currently unclear or non-existent.
d. Insufficiently protected legal interests under civil law with weak complaint mechanism for large victims’ 
groups and high financial risks for the workers lead to important barriers. Recent research for the ETUC 
on ‘letterbox companies and company law’ (Cremers 2019) revealed that the application of criminal law 
for corporate (mis)behaviour and the sanctioning of non-genuine corporate activities are often absent. 
Moreover, even the ‘eligibility’ in a foreign constituency can be problematic. 
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5.3  A VAST AREA AND AN EXTENSIVE BODY OF REGULATION
We realise that the subject of this 2nd stage covers a large and important area, with an extensive body of 
(non-binding) regulation and legislation. Given the limitations in time and budget, we have tried in the 
conducted work to provide an updated overview of the relevant aspects at stake, with a focus on legally binding 
provisions. Therefore, we synthesised existing studies and analysed and interpreted research from the angle of 
labour standards and employment rights. 
The first section of this report reveals that the legal frame for subcontracting (in commercial or business law) 
excludes in general terms the existence of an employment relationship between a main contractor and a 
subcontractor. In recent years this has become a battlefield in court cases. The difference between a contract of 
service (a labour contract) and a contract for (the provision of) services is at the heart of many disputes in the 
gig economy (Uber, Deliveroo et cetera). In their tests, courts have been looking at subordination, autonomy, 
planning and other aspects that characterise the existence of a labour contract (‘substance over form’). A 
second point that is relevant here is the allocation of the employer; subcontractors are the employer of their 
workforce and fully bear the related responsibilities. Interesting in this regard is the fact that for some working 
conditions (notably in the area of OHS) a joint responsibility has been settled as a default. But otherwise, 
most countries have few specific rules or conditions in place in the social field which concern subcontractors 
as legal entities. Finally, it can be concluded that chain liability provisions related to workers’ rights or labour 
standards are, with some exceptions, only sporadically formulated in direct relationship with the regulation of 
subcontracting. The national examples of stricter regulation (limiting of subcontracting levels, strengthening of 
chain liability, verification duty, regulation of labour-only subcontracting or agency work) show great difficulties 
of applicability, enforcement and a lack of dissuasive penalties. 
The second section examines the different international frameworks that address due diligence. Among others, 
due diligence requires a corporation to investigate third party partners for potential abuse of human rights. 
Overall, due diligence can be characterised as ‘soft law’. Cases before court concern mainly civil law cases 
on environmental liability often brought against a parent company for harms which took place through the 
activities of its subsidiary, and raise questions of parent company liability and duty of care. Compliance with 
fundamental social rights, such as equal treatment, dignity or fair working conditions is less explored. Due 
diligence has also been introduced at EU-level in the Enforcement Directive 2014/67 that aims to strengthen 
the PWD. The demands for stronger regulatory action at EU level in order to protect workers, communities, and 
the environment from systematic, ongoing and worsening human rights and environmental impacts linked to 
the global supply chains of businesses and financial institutions are on the increase. The assessment of the 
French duty of vigilance legislation shows the need for a strengthening of the (still scarce) law in this respect, 
with better monitoring and adequate remedies. 
The third section examines the legal frame for joint and several liability. At the level of international law, there 
is a lack of clear arrangements concerning the liability in production or services chains. At EU level, several 
Directives have been adopted with regard to cross-border subcontracting liability. And at national level, liability 
measures have been established regarding wages, health & safety at the workplace, social security premiums 
and taxes. In practice, legal uncertainty resulting from exemption clauses, the use of ‘due diligence’ and wide 
margins of interpretation makes it relatively easy to escape liability. Moreover, it is not self-evident for workers 
to claim their rights in civil proceedings, especially in a cross-border context. Relevant to mention here is the 
introduction in the Enforcement Directive of a provision that enables trade unions and other third parties, such 
as associations, organisations and other legal entities having a legitimate interest in compliance with the PWD, 
to engage, on behalf or in support of the posted workers, and with their approval, in any judicial or adminis-
trative proceedings. In some countries the application of chain liability has been strengthened. In Germany, it 
applies irrespective of any preventive measures of the contractor. Even the most thorough due diligence will 
not prevent possible liability as there is no escape clause. Other countries focus on the duty of verification at 
the top of the chain or the tackling of artificial corporate legal entities.
The fourth section deals with non-financial reporting. Reporting tasks can be based on mandatory legal 
requirements or fit in a voluntary framework that provides the reporting entity with guidance and suggested 
codes. The ‘binding’ character varies in character; most requirements can be seen as ‘soft law’, with normative 
expectations and standards. Non-compliance with codes cannot be brought to court. Due to the voluntary 
nature and the lack of stringent monitoring mechanisms, reports are often not presented in an accessible way 
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and information on risks, impacts and their management is incomplete or lacking. There is a serious risk of 
‘impact washing’. The EU has taken steps towards a more binding regulation in 2014, with Directive 2014/95/EU 
on non-financial reporting. However, assessments reveal that most undertakings in all Member States, with the 
monitoring of the reporting and the enforcement of duties very moderately prescribed, fail to disclose relevant, 
material, meaningful and comparable sustainability information. Another serious weakness of the Directive is 
that there is only reference to subcontracting chains in the recitals, not in the core articles of the Directive.
Our analysis reveals that there is first and for all a lack of strong legally binding provisions. As far as chain 
responsibility and shared responsibility, irrespective of where the workers involved come from and under 
which legal status they work, are enshrined in law, the legal instruments are too often inadequate and inef-
fective. Our investigation reveals also that in many of the areas covered by international instruments that deal 
with or prescribe (aspects of) corporate behaviour the attention for labour rights (or human social rights) is 
lagging behind, or is even absent. Environmental concerns (and sometimes very generally formulated care for 
human rights) come first. In recent years, this has only slightly changed. Clearly, respect for and priority given 
to labour rights and standards is still not seen as ‘business as usual’, as an integral part of the functioning of a 
business. Companies rather adopt symbolic, low-cost steps to convey the impression of obligation fulfilment. 
Assessments in this regard speak about costs, risks and incentives, not about societal goals and social objec-
tives. 
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